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Abstract
Vast investments have recently been made worldwide in developing the Cyber-Physical
System (CPS) technology with the expectations of improving economical and societal
structures. However, great care must be paid to the CPS’ complexity, the impact of
emerging IoT (Internet of Things) protocols on the CPS infrastructure as well as the
impact of information dissemination by these protocols on the safety of these
infrastructures. This paper addresses the issue of CPS safety by proposing and
evaluating the performance of a CPS management framework and the analysis of the
dynamics of the underlining IoT network in the cyber-space. The main contributions of
this paper are in threefold. Firstly, a new CPS framework is proposed; that: 1) builds
around a layered architecture to compartmentalise the CPS functionalities into different
modules for efficiency and scalability and 2) uses an inner feedback loop for the efficient
management of CPS infrastructure. Secondly, building upon this framework, a novel
diffusion model that uses the epidemic (interference) sets to produce accurate diffusion
patterns across the CPS’ IoT subsystem is proposed. Finally, the proposed diffusion
model is numerically analysed to show how it can be used to achieve efficient CPS
surveillance in order to trigger reconfiguration to re-optimise the CPS when it is under
stress. in IoT settings. The numerical analysis of the diffusion model shows that
interference propagates in pairwise disjoint sets, with IoT nodes migrating from
“susceptible” to “attacked” statuses and finally reaching the “removed” state at a
predictable time. Deployment considerations on some of the current social and public
networks are also considered..
Introduction
In recent times, vast investments have been made globally in the development of Cyber
Physical Systems (CPS) technologies. It is expected that CPS would pave the way for
solutions to key economic and societal challenges such as coping with an ageing
population, addressing climate change, improving issues of health and public safety,
supporting the switch to renewable energy, planning for megacities, tackling limited
resources, achieving sustainability and globalisation as well as proffering solutions to
mobility challenges. Similarly, Internet-of-Things (IoT) principles are finding their way
into the next generation CPS to enable extended interactive functionality between the
physical and virtual environments. CPS are a new generation of systems that play a key
role in interconnecting the physical and virtual worlds. This is achieved by integrating
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computing and communication capabilities with the dynamics of physical and
engineered systems; and is expected to provide different ways of interacting and
manipulating physical systems through seamless network connectivity and refined user
control over the actuation side.
The Impact of the IoT subsystem on the CPS
CPS and IoT technologies are currently enjoying tremendous attention globally. It is
believed that these technologies can improve economical and societal structures as well
as extend the interactive functionality between real and virtual environments. To this
end, large amount of funds and efforts are being put into them. However, great
considerations must be paid to the impacts of the complex emerging IoT platforms and
standards on the CPS infrastructure. These impacts can be viewed from three
dimensions viz:
• The Impact of Complexity on CPS. By enabling the information to be
collected and communicated among everybody, everything and anything, the
IoT-aware CPS will usher in a new era where cyberspace, physical space, human
knowledge and social activities are integrated into a universal platform. With
these various components synchronised, we gain the ability to monitor the real
world in ways that we could not fathom possible without the IoT. However, such
benefits come at the expense of complex CPS platforms with heterogeneous
components, multiple functionalities, rules and feedback loops. These could lead
to new kinds of risks and vulnerabilities such as - rapid spread of hazards, faults
or disturbances across entire systems of devices as a result of domino or cascading
effects. Such disturbances which previously would have been localised to a single
device, could evolving into large-scale, system-wide failure or disaster(s) if
uncontained.
• The Impact of Standards on CPS. Current generation CPS are managed by
Networked Control Systems (NCS), wherein physical processes are controlled by
networks of sensors, actuators and controllers. These are often built around static
topologies with pre-planned routing and scheduling mechanisms mandated by
standard wireless protocols such the WirelessHART [51]. Though these standards
provide real-time guarantees for delay-sensitive applications, they do not consider
performance-related tasks such as management of resources at the physical layer,
link layer scheduling of nodes and\or end-to-end network layer routing of traffic
flows. It is predicted that the next generation CPS will be built around
performance aware NCS that rely on its IoT subsystem for the sensing and
actuation on the environment being controlled. These would take advantage of the
IoT communication infrastructure and its lightweight protocols to support sensing
and actuation in CPS. They would also provide varied services to users while
meeting the requirements of high throughput, high reliability and energy efficiency
while operating within bounded communication delays [24, 50].
• The Impact of Information Diffusion on CPS Safety. The CPS of the
future will be designed around a network infrastructure that interconnect islands
of IoT networks, with information diffusion implemented on tree-like network
topologies rooted at the gateway(s). The management of such forest of
interconnected trees requires formal modelling and accurate performance analysis
before and during deployment. Collection tree protocols [6, 21, 22] are rapidly
gaining ground in the IoT field. They are protocols that rely on a spanning tree
structure rooted at the sink of a sensor network to enable information diffusion
from sensor nodes to the sink (which is usually connected to a gateway). The
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management of the information diffusion in collection tree based infrastructures is
a challenging issue that needs to be addressed efficiently in order to avoid local
disturbances escalating into global disasters.
Contributions and outline
The discovery of information flow within the proposed framework and its impact on the
network engineering process are two key issues that can positively affect the CPS
efficiency. These issues can be described as follows:
Diffusion pattern discovery: The diffusion of information in sensor networks
usually follows a pattern that defines the network connectivity in terms of interactions
between the nodes, the effect they might have on each others and the routing of
information from nodes to the gateway. The discovery of such pattern and its underlying
data structure is therefore a vital process in understanding the aforementioned.
Impact on network engineering: The data structure underlying the diffusion
pattern in a sensor network may exhibit some properties that can greatly impact on the
efficiency of the network and traffic engineering processes. In some cases, it can
translate into a performance parameter that may be correlated to other key
performance parameters of the network. The evaluation of such impact is another key
process that can provide important insights on the network engineering process.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. Firstly, we propose a unified and
integrated IoT-CPS framework that builds upon a layered model to achieve scalability
through modularity. Secondly, we present a diffusion model using an epidemic
compartmental structure for such a framework. Lastly, a numerical analysis and
validation of the efficacy of the proposed diffusion model with respect to network
information flow and engineering is presented.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. After the current section, we
present the main components of the CPS framework and its underlying inner feedback
loop and features in Section . Thereafter, the information diffusion model is proposed in
Section , while the CPS surveillance model is described in Section . In Section the
corresponding numerical results are presented while deployment considerations and use
cases are described in Section . Section draws a conclusion and exposes some avenues
for future research based on the results obtained and analysed.
The Cyber Physical System Framework
The CPS framework considered in this paper is built around a layered architecture
presented in Figure 1 and a management model that evolves around the inner feedback
loop illustrated by Figure 2.
The CPS Layered Architecture
Figure 1 depicts our proposed CPS framework. It can be deployed as an IoT-cloud
infrastructure that relies on a multi-layer architecture to provide modularity and
scalability. These layers are described as follows:
IoT Layer: This layer reveals a platform where sensing devices including
positioning, identification and actuation devices are embedded into physical objects to
get readings and react on the objects when the obtained readings have reached pre-set
thresholds. These sensing devices can be organised as peer-to-peer or tree topologies
enabling single hop communication [36, 37] or as a mesh of interconnected devices using
a participative approach to complete tasks and multi-hop approach for
communication.[4, 5, 6]. We note that when deployed into a mesh infrastructure, the
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Figure 1. CPS Layered Architecture
IoT subsystem will play an important role in the stability, safety and reliability of the
CPS because i) an attack on any node of the subsystem may be masqueraded as a
normal reconfiguration process which might have adverse effects on the CPS and ii) the
routing process implemented by the IoT subsystem may have a negative impact on the
CPS, destabilising it and impacting negatively on its performance.
Edge Computing Layer: The edge computer layer is responsible for
analog-to-digital preprocessing and aggregation of data for further processing. While
these gateways may be static/fixed, mobile devices such as mobile phones and drones
can also be used to collect, preprocess, and ferry/mule the data to processing points as
proposed in [31, 32, 33, 34]. This layer also hosts a software defined network (SDN)
controller that i) collects routing information from the IoT layer and computes the
collection tree used to route the sensor/actuator readings for the IoT subsystem and ii)
perform CPS surveillance to discover relevant diffusion patterns in order to apply
network reconfiguration in order to re-optimise the CPS under stress conditions.
Fog Computing Layer: The fog computing layer is a storage and processing layer.
It is located close to the users to minimise transmission delays, security and ownership
and other challenges often associated with public cloud computing infrastructures. This
layer is responsible for storing and preprocessing the data collected from the edge
computing layer before moving the preprocessed data to the cloud for further insights
[38].
Services/Applications Layer: CPS services are provided to the users through
various applications at this layer. They are usually provided using the
Software-As-A-Service (SAAS) model of cloud computing. Some of the application areas
of the proposed CPS model include cyber physical health systems
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(CPHS) [39, 40, 41, 42], cyber physical solar energy systems (CPSS) [43, 44], cyber
physical environment systems (CPES) including water, air pollution [48, 49] and noise
pollution monitoring systems for the protection of the environment, cyber physical
public safety systems (CPPS) [45, 46, 47] and many other emerging from niche areas
such as social networks to control how information is disseminated between circles of
friends, relatives, and acquaintances.
Figure 2. Inner Feedback Loop
Our proposed framework is made up of four layers but also includes an inner
feedback loop revealing the interactions between the cyber and physical spaces. This is
shown in Figure 2 where: 1) a bottom-up flow of information triggered by sensing of
physical objects in the physical space is translated into services at the higher levels and
2) a top-down flow of information may be initiated by the processing of data in the
cyber space to achieve physical actuation on the physical objects managed by the CPS.
The CPS Surveillance Model
Both the Internet-of-Things and social networks and others are structured around a
graph model connecting different nodes. In this graph, edges are the interconnecting
links while the vertices are nodes that produce and/or consume information. With
respect to IoT networks, the nodes can be sensors, actuators, identification nodes (RFID
readers and tags) and localisation nodes (GPS nodes); while in social networks, the
nodes are usually human users who share the information following a structured model
embedded into the underlying communication protocols. In the Internet-of-Things,
collection tree structures have been massively used as diffusion structures for the
collection of information from sensor/actuator nodes and disseminating same to sink
node(s) for further processing. On the other hand, social networks (such as Facebook,
Whatsapp, Skype, Instagram etc.) might either follow the same diffusion tree structure
or a different information dissemination model for sharing information between users.
This paper’s focus lies on an information dissemination model that uses collection
tree structure for sharing information among nodes of a network. As revealed by
Figure 3, an IoT or social network can be structured around a graph model that
connects nodes (sensors/actuators in an IoT setting or human users in a social network
setting) but with different information flowing between them. Information flowing
within IoT networks would be sensor/actuator readings while across social networks it
might be news shared among friends/family members and other users.
In the IoT, protocols such as RPL [22], CTP [21] and LIBP [7] use collection tree
protocols for information collection (from regions of interest) and routing to processing
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Figure 3. Relevance of CPS Surveillance
locations (where they are consumed and/or processed). In social networks, information
dissemination may follow a similar structure where each user is provided a diffusion tree
similar to a collection tree to be used for sharing information among friends/relatives
and other social media relationships. Irrespective of the application domain, the
structure of the diffusion/collection tree might have a great impact on the performance
of the underlying network. As illustrated in Figure 3, two different structures could be
derived from the initial network: i) a myopic structure that may lead to overloading
some nodes (such as node 2 carrying 9 children for example) while leaving others idle or
underloaded (node 3 for example carrying only one child/descendant) and ii) a balanced
network where each node has relatively lower number of dependents/children.
When applied to an IoT network, the collection tree structure may lead to the IoT
provider’s network experience engineering performance issues, especially when the node
carrying a high number of descendants is a critical node (such as a sensitive unit of an
hospital for instance controlled by nodes 2, 5, 6 and 9 in our illustration). Similarly,
within social networks, when similar information dissemination structures are used,
providers might experience greater losses when heavily loaded nodes either fail or are
attacked. From a user’s perspective, these heavily loaded nodes are synonymous to
social media influencers, with millions of followers or friends and as such are pivotal in
disseminating both good and bad information. This reveals the relevance of i) the
impact of the IoT subsystem on the CPS ii) the CPS surveillance to analyse the IoT
subsystem in order to take appropriate measures when the CPS reliability and/or its
performance is at stake and iii) the CPS reconfiguration for restoring the CPS
stability/performance when it is under stress.
The focus of this paper lies on the CPS surveillance using collection tree structures
and their potential extensions to social media networks. The IoT subsystem
reconfiguration when it is under stress conditions is also an important feature of the
CPS, however it is beyond the scope of this paper.
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The Information Diffusion Model
As revealed by Figure 1, the CPS of the future will be designed around a network
infrastructure that interconnect islands of IoT subsystems alongside an information
diffusion model implemented based on a tree-like topology rooted at gateways. The
management of such a forest of interconnected trees requires formal modelling and
accurate analysis before deployment. The information diffusion model adopted by this
paper is presented below.
Epidemic Models
Epidemic models known as Susceptible, Infected and Recovered (or removed) (SIR)
were pioneered around 1927 to describe the interaction between individuals when a
disease breaks out within a given population [9]. Since inception, the initial SIR model
has been continuously used to solve problems in various domains as recorded by Table 1.
These include network problems [11, 12, 15, 16]. It has also been modified and extended
into different other models such as ”E-SIRS”, ”SIRS” and ”SIR-M”. As revealed by
Table 1, in some of these extended models [10, 11, 12], the network nodes are grouped
into disjoint sets leading to compartmental models. The analysis of these models is
usefully done by using the basic reproduction number R0 which is usually computed
using the next generation matrix denoted by K [13, 14]. These epidemic models can
have a tremendous impact on the stability of a network. However, it can be seen from
Table 1 that most of these models fall short when considering the impact the death of
potentially susceptible, infected and removed individuals has on the network. Moreover,
all the models assume a predefined nodal interaction and this can lead to uncontrolled
epidemic transmission with significantly negative impact on the accuracy of the models.
Table 1. Epidemic Models
Model Domains Advantages Disadvantages Applications
Susceptible-
Infected-
Protected
(SIP) [26]
Network secu-
rity
Evolution of
the network is
considered as
a continuous
time Markov
Process.
Nodes are as-
sumed to be
similar.
Network Secu-
rity & Com-
puter virus de-
tection.
Susceptible-
Infected-
Susceptible
(SIS) [27]
Graph theory
& Mathemati-
cal biology
Provide
stochastic
model us-
ing Markov
Process.
Nodes in the
graph are
equal.
Network
topology
design &
Network
phenomena
(information
dissemina-
tion).
Susceptible-
Infected-
Recovery-
Susceptible
(SIRS) [28]
Communication Simulates real
life scenarios.
Uncontrolled
transition.
Social net-
working &
Information
diffusion.
Epidemic
Routing
model [29]
Routing Support for
mobile net-
works.
All nodes are
assumed to be
the same.
Mobile & gen-
eral network
routing.
Susceptible-
Infected-
Recovered
with Mainte-
nance (SIR-M)
[30]
Epidemiology Network
flexibility
analysis.
Combined both
random and
uniform node
distribution.
Mobile & gen-
eral network
communica-
tion.
Figure 4. Interference thresholds defining epidemic sets
When dealing with collection tree protocols, the number of children carried by a
node, also referred to as the node’s interference, can be translated into an epidemic
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state expressing the level of contamination of the node. Using two interference
thresholds T1 and T2 and following the SIR epidemic model, we consider the SAR
model that uses three epidemic states referred to as susceptible (safe), attacked or
removed statuses. The safe, attacked and removed states are loosely respectively
equivalent to the susceptible, infected and removed states of the SIR model. These
states and the associated thresholds are depicted by Figure 4.
We define the considered states as follows:
1. Susceptible nodes: are the least or non-interfering nodes in a network. Their
total number is denoted by S. Each susceptible node n is assumed to have weight
(level of interference) less than the threshold T1.
2. Attacked nodes: are highly interfering but still operational nodes. The total
number of infected nodes in a network is denoted by A. An infected node is
assumed to have weight less than the threshold T2 but at least equal to the
threshold T1.
3. Removed nodes: are nodes which are no longer functional because of the high
level of interference between them. These nodes are referred to as dead nodes and
their total number is denoted by R. A node is considered to be removed if its
interference is at least equal to the threshold T2.
As defined above, the threshold setting process can be used to partition the network
nodes into “susceptible: S”, “affected: A”, and “removed: R” epidemic sets which may
have different economic and engineering impacts on real networks.
Diffusion Sets
Consider a sensor network defined by the structure G(L,N ,W, s) where L stands for
the set of its links, N is the set of its sensor nodes and W is the set of the nodes
weights (node interference in LIBP context) while s is the sink of the sensor network.
Besides being partitioned into epidemic sets based on interference, the network G can
also be partitioned into interference sets which define the way a group of nodes can
impact other nodes upon an increase or decrease in interference level, while a collection
routing protocol such as LIBP is adopted. In the rest of this paper, we refer to the
superset of diffusion sets as I = ∪ıIı.
Definition: Consider a network G(L,N ,W, s) as defined in Section and define d as
a distance function where d(n) is the smallest number of hops from the network
node n to the sink s. A diffusion set Iı ∈ I is a non empty subset of I satisfying
the following properties:
Properties:
P1: All nodes in set Iı are at the same distance from the sink, i.e.
∀x, y ∈ Iı, d(x) = d(y)
P2: Iı is a singleton, or for each node x in Iı there is another node y in Iı such
that x and y share the next neighbour. (Here, the next neighbour node of
node n refers to a node connected to n which is at (d(n) + 1)th hop)
P3: For each node x in N , if x shares a next neighbour (which is at d(x) + 1)
with some node in Iı, then x : Iı.
Note: A diffusion set is determined only by the network structure but might have an
impact on the dynamics on the algorithm only upon interference transmission
between diffusion sets.
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Illustration
As an example, Figure 5 shows two graphs whose nodes are grouped into diffusion sets.
(a) A random network (b) A grid network
Figure 5. Diffusion sets.
Diffusion sets
The network depicted by Figure 5(a) has a random structure with nodes a, b and c
being at the same distance (same height) from the sink s and nodes a and b sharing the
same next neighbour node d. Nodes b and c share the same next neighbour node f .
Therefore a, b and c are in the same diffusion set (from P2). Likewise, nodes d and e are
the same distance from sink s and share the same next neighbour h; while nodes f and
g are the same distance from sink s and share the next neighbour i. From Figure 5(a),
it can be seen that the nodes are grouped in diffusion sets as follows:
I1 = {S}, I2 = {a, b, c}, I3 = {f, g},
I4 = {d, e}, I5 = {h} and I6 = {i}.
It is clear that the set of all nodes N of the presented graph is the union of all
diffusion sets of the graph. That is N = ∪6i=1Ii. On the other hand all diffusion sets of
the graph are pairwise disjoint. That is Ii ∩ Ij 6= ∅ ⇔ i = j. Therefore, the set
I = {I1, I2, I3, I4, I5, I6} of all diffusion sets forms a partition of the set N . On the
other hand, nodes e and f are the same distance from s but do not share the same next
neighbour node and are not consequently in the same diffusion set. Furthermore, nodes
h and i which do not have a common next neighbour node are referred to as singletons.
The grid network in Figure 5(b) presents a symmetric structure where all nodes
which at the same distance from the sink (Node 0) are in the same diffusion set. In that
network, the diffusion sets computed are:
I1 = {0}, I2 = {25}, I3 = {1, 6}, I4 = {2, 10, 7}, I5 = {3, 11, 14, 8}, I6 =
{4, 12, 15, 18, 9}, I7 = {24, 21}I8 = {22, 19, 16, 13}, I9 = {20, 23, 17}.
Similarly to the random network, the diffusion sets of the symmetric network form
disjoint groups. Furthermore, it is clear that each node belongs to an interference set
which partitions the underlining network. This makes it possible to quantitatively
model the network system without counting nodes more than once.
It also reveals a compartmental structure where nodes in the same compartment
(diffusion set) might experience similar impact from attacks, failures or congestion.
This shows that the interference transmission on a network would be determined
bases on related dynamics across its interference sets.
Interference Transmission
Given the two networks depicted by Figures 5(a) and 5(b), it can be observed that two
nodes are in the same diffusion set if and only if, any increase in interference level of one
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Figure 6. Interference transmission.
of them might also result in an increased interference of the other. This means that two
nodes can transfer interference to each other. This is possible since these nodes are at
the same distance (same height) from the sink and also share the same next neighbour
node from the sink. Furthermore, Figure 6 illustrates the transmission of interference
between diffusion sets by showing that an increase in the interference level of a node
does not necessarily affect all nodes in the network but rather affects the set of nodes in
its diffusion set.
Figure 6 shows a network partitioned into diffusion sets G1, G2, G3 and singletons
with node 4 being attacked while node 3 is in removed state. Note that removal may be
caused by an intruder getting access to network and increasing the node’s interference
level beyond the T2 threshold. In this network, node 5 which is in the same diffusion set
as node 4 is susceptible to the infection caused by its attacked diffusion set mate (node
4). Since node 3 is removed, all adjacent links should be removed, that is the links
(3, 6), (3, 7). This should lead to node 7 changing its set membership to form a new
diffusion set G4 with the singleton 11.
Note that the diffusion sets define a new structure of nodes in a network which
reveals how an increase of interference level (weight) of a node may impact other nodes.
This is why in this case we say that interference is transferred from one node to another.
The CPS Surveillance Model
As described above, we consider a diffusion model where nodes are grouped into
diffusion sets with nodes in the same diffusion set assumed to be infectiously similar to
each others while those in different diffusion sets behave differently. This section
presents an analytical model of the interference diffusion and an analysis of its stability.
In our model, each diffusion set Iı is composed by subsets of nodes defined by
Iı = {Sı, Aı, Rı}. The subset Sı of susceptible nodes which are working normally
and not yet affected is of a size denoted by Si while the subset attacked nodes in Iı
has its size defined by Ai. Finally the subset of removed nodes in Iı is of size defined
by Ri. When the diffusion set Iı includes both the attacked and removed sets which are
non empty (Ai 6= 0 or Ri 6= 0), it is said to be an infected set. The diffusion problem
consists of finding for each diffusion set Iı its evolution function over time
Iı(t) = {Si(t), Ai(t), Ri(t)} as defined below
Find Iı(t) = [Si(t), Ai(t), Ri(t)]
subject to
(1)
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
∀x ∈ S → w(x) < T1 (1.a)
∀x ∈ A → T1 ≤ w(x) < T2 (1.b)
∀x ∈ R → w(x) ≥ T2 (1.c)
∀Sı,A ∈ I → λij ≤ λ (1.d)
∀Aı,R ∈ I → ρij ≤ ρ (1.e)
∀Sı ∈ I → ηi ≤ η (1.f)
where λij is the transmission rate from susceptible diffusion set Sı to attacked
diffusion set A while ρij is the transmission rate from attacked diffusion set Aı to
removed diffusion set R. ηi is a parameter revealing the impact of the diffusion on the
network if a susceptible node in diffusion set Sı becomes infected: attacked or removed.
Note that the diffusion model does not express any dependability constraints. It only
expresses a set finding function and how it is mapped into i) a set finding problem
expressed by the routing objective (1). Equations (1.a), (1.b) and (1.c) express the
network partitioning into interference states: susceptible: S, attacked: A and removed:
R. Equations (1.d), (1.e) and (1.f) are diffusion equations that express and limit the
interference diffusion from one set to another and reveal the impact of moving nodes
from the susceptible to infected states (attacked or removed) on the network.
Analytical Description
Figure 7. Representation of interference transmission.
Figure 7 presents a finite state machine of our diffusion model for a network which
has been partitioned into m diffusion sets. It reveals the states of the diffusion sets and
for each state its associated transitions as a well as the actions that trigger transitions
from one state to another.
Susceptible nodes in the diffusion set Iı may be attacked at the rate ai, while the
attacked nodes from Iı get removed at the rate ci. Susceptible nodes in the interference
set Iı may highly increase their interference levels so as to move directly to the removed
status without transiting via the attacked status. On the other hand removed nodes my
cause some of the susceptible or attacked nodes to leave the network because of the
destruction of links. We consider bi to be the rate with which, susceptible nodes in Iı are
removed. Susceptible nodes from diffusion set Iı migrate to diffusion set I with rate λij ,
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and infected nodes in Iı migrate to I at a rate of ρij . Note that in our model, removed
nodes may cause migration of nodes from one diffusion set to another. The difference
equation (equation 2) presented below is a result of the assumptions made above.
S′i = −aiSi +
∑
j 6=i
λjiSj −
∑
j 6=i
λijSi − biSi
A′i = aiSi +
∑
j 6=i
ρjiAj −
∑
j 6=i
ρijAi − ciAi
R′i = biSi + ciAi
(2)
Note that Si, Ai and Ri are functions of time t for each diffusion set Iı. The negative
rates in the model represents a decrease, while the positive ones represent an increase.
The parameter ai stands for the transmission rate between susceptible and infected
nodes. This parameter depends directly on the number of susceptible nodes Si and the
infected ones Ai. It therefore makes sense to relate ai with two other measures:
1. The susceptibility rate of each node in the diffusion set Iı, denoted by βi.
2. Infectiousness rate of nodes in the infected diffusion set Iı, denoted by γi.
Conversely, the structure of a diffusion set clearly influences the attack ability, as the
effects of infections vary across different diffusion sets. We use the parameter ηi as a
measure of the impact on the network structure when a node gets infected (attacked or
removed). Therefore, ai can be computed using the following formula:
ai = βiγiηi
Ai
N
(3)
where AiN denotes the fraction of infected nodes in diffusion set Iı.
By replacing the equation 3 into the difference equation 2, we get the following
equations. 
S′i = −βiγiηi AiN Si +
∑
j 6=i
λjiSj −
∑
j 6=i
λijSi − biSi
A′i = βiγiηi
Ai
N Si +
∑
j 6=i
ρjiAj −
∑
j 6=i
ρijAi − ciAi
R′i = biSi + ciAi
(4)
Stability Analysis
In this section, we study the stability of the system at the disease-free equilibrium
points by assuming that:
1. there is no node newly joining the network. That is, at any time t, if N is the
number of nodes at time t = 0, then N =
∑
i
Si(t) +
∑
i
Ai(t) +
∑
i
Ri(t).
2. the death ( not caused by interference) and birth rate are assumed to be zero.
3. the rates in equation 4 are constant.
4. in the networks considered, the death of nodes do not cause new diffusion sets
formation.
We first compute the disease-free equilibrium of the system which will be used to
compute the basic reproduction number R0 which is the number used for studying the
stability.
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Disease-free equilibrium (DFE)
Consider equation 4 and assume the sets of diffusion sets in I whose size is m. Since
the system is not affected by the number of removed nodes R, the equation of R is
omitted. We present DFE as E = (e1, e2, · · · , e2m) = (Si, Ai = 0) , i = 1, 2, ...,m, which
verifies the equations
∀i ∈ I, βiγiηiAi
N
Si +
∑
j 6=i
λjiSj −
∑
j 6=i
λijSi − biSi = 0. (5)
Since Ai = 0, Equation 5 is reduced to:
∀i ∈ I,
∑
j 6=i
λjiSj −
∑
j 6=i
λijSi − biSi = 0. (6)
Since the system of equations (6) is linear, it can be written in matrix form
SA = 0 (7)
where, S = (S1S2 · · ·Sm) and
A =

− ∑
j 6=1
λ1j − b1 λ12 · · · λ1m
λ21 −
∑
j 6=2
λ2j − b2 · · · λ2m
...
...
. . .
...
λm1 λm2 · · · −
∑
j 6=m
λmj − bm

Case 1: If detA 6= 0 then Si = 0, i = 1, 2, · · ·m is the unique solution of Equation (7). In
this case the DFE is E0 = (S
∗
i = 0, A
∗
i = 0).
Case 2: If detA = 0 then the system of equations ( 7) has infinitely many solutions, and
thus the system will have infinite number of DFE whose form is E = (S∗i , A
∗
i = 0)
where S∗i may not all be zero.
Note that according to Linear Algebra, det(A) = 0 if and only if the rows or columns of
A are linearly dependent. This can help us to study the dependency of diffusion sets
in terms of interference transmission.
Stability of a network at DFE
We can study stability using the basic reproduction number R0. R0 can be calculated
using the next-generation matrix approach as described in [13, 14].
After removing the Ri equations, the systems of equation (6) left can be decomposed
into two subsystems as follows:
Fi(Si, Ai) =
{
0
βiγiηi
Ai
N Si
(8)
Vi(Si, Ai) =

βiγiηi
Ai
N Si −
∑
j 6=i
λjiSj +
∑
j 6=i
λijSi + biSi
−∑
j 6=i
ρjiAj +
∑
j 6=i
ρijAi + ciAi
(9)
The next-generation matrix is K = FV −1 where F and V are the Jacobian matrices
of F and V respectively, evaluated at the DFE.
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Case1: If detA 6= 0 the DFE is E0 = (S∗i = 0, A∗i = 0). and the Jacobian of F evaluated
at E0 is
Fij(E0) =
∂Fi
∂ej
(E0) is the zero matrix.
Consequently, the matrix K = FV −1 is the zero matrix. The eigenvalues of the
matrix K are all zero and hence the basic reproductive number is R0 = 0. Since
R0 < 1, the DFE E0 is globally stable. This is explained by the fact that at E0
the network is empty and will remain empty because no new nodes join it.
Case2: If detA = 0 then the system of equations (7) has more than one solutions, and
thus the system will have more than one DFE points whose form is
E = (S∗i , A
∗
i = 0) where S
∗
i may not all be zero.
F =

β1γ1η1
S∗1
N 0 · · · 0
0 β2γ2η2
S∗2
N · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · βmγmηmS
∗
m
N
 = [δij(βiγiηi S
∗
j
N )]ij
V =

∑
j 6=1
ρ1j + c1 0 · · · 0
0
∑
j 6=2
ρ2j + c2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · ∑
j 6=m
ρmj + cm

= [δij(
∑
j 6=1
ρ1j + ci)]ij
where δij is the Kronecker delta. That is δij = (i = j).
K = FV −1 = [(
βiγiηi
S∗j
N∑
j 6=i
ρij + ci
)δij ]ij
Since K is a diagonal matrix, the basic reproduction number is
R0 = Trace(K) =
m∑
i=1
βiγiηi
S∗i
N∑
j 6=i
ρij + ci
.
Performance Evaluation
This section reports on the numerical analysis of the diffusion model in relation to the
diffusion sets and the epidemic sets. Table 2 shows the initial conditions of the
considered network and its performance benchmark parameters.
The results presented in this section are related to the diffusion model expressed by
the difference equation 2. To solve this equation, we used the Euler method described
in [17]. For all our simulation experiments, the numerical results are presented as
graphs that show the changes in the number of nodes in each class of a given diffusion
set. Our numerical computation and plotting of related graphs were carried out using
the PyLAB Python package.
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Table 2. Diffusion model’s parameters.
Parameter Description Value
N Total number of nodes of a network 193
m Number of chosen diffusion sets 4
S0i Initial number of susceptible nodes in the
set i
S01 = 30, S
0
2 = 30 , S
0
3 = 33, S
0
4 = 35
A0i Initial number of infected nodes in the set
i
A01 = 10, A
0
2 = 20 , A
0
3 = 25, A
0
4 = 25
R0i Initial number of removed nodes in the
set i
R01 = 0, R
0
2 = 0 , R
0
3 = 5, R
0
4 = 0
λij Transmission rate from susceptible diffu-
sion set i to infected diffusion set j
λ12 = 0.04, λ21 = 0.03, λij = 0,
with i > 2 or j > 2
ρij Transmission rate from infected diffusion
set i to removed diffusion set j
ρ12 = 0.01 = ρ21, ρij = 0, with i > 2 or
j > 2
bi Migration rate from susceptible nodes in
diffusion set i to infected nodes in i
b1 = 0.01, b2 = 0.02, b3 = 0.03, b4 =
0.04
ci Migration rate from infected nodes in dif-
fusion set i to removed nodes in i
c1 = 0.02, c2 = 0.02, c3 = 0.03, c4 =
0.04
βi Susceptibility of a node in diffusion set i β1 = 0.11, β2 = 0.1, β3 = 0.2, β4 = 0.3
γi Infectiousness of a node in diffusion set i γ1 = 0.4, γ2 = 0.4, γ3 = 0.5, γ4 = 0.6
ηi Network impact if a susceptible node in
diffusion set i becomes infected: attacked
or removed
η1 = 0.4, η2 = 0.4, η3 = 0.5, η4 = 0.6
The Performance Parameters
Three main performance parameters are considered: 1) the performance patterns 2) the
migration rates from safe state to other states and 3) the migration rates across
diffusion sets.
1. Performance patterns. The performance patterns [Si(t), Ai(t), Ri(t)] are
functions that shows the evolution of routing process over time. They reveal how
nodes move from states to states and across diffusion sets.
2. State-to-state migration. This performance parameter expresses the rate by
which nodes change states by moving from one state to another in the order
defined earlier: S, A, R. It includes two parameters: the safe to attacked
migration expressed by s− 2− a and the attacked to removed migration expressed
by a− 2− r parameter.
3. Set-to-set migration. This performance parameter expresses the rate of which
nodes change their affiliation by moving from one diffusion set to another. It is
expressed by s(x)− 2− s(y) where x and y are two different diffusion sets. For
the 4 states considered, this might lead to 12 combinations.
We also consider four diffusion sets namely i) I1 = (S1, A1, R1) ii) I2 = (S2, A2, R2)
iii) I3 = (S3, A3, R3) and iv) I4 = (S4, A4, R4).
Performance benchmark results
Susceptible states. Figure 8(a) reveals a “birth-growth-decrease” pattern where the
number of susceptible nodes born when joining the network grows with increase in
interference (when the nodes accept children) and decreases when they reach a high
interference threshold defining an infected status: attacked or removed. According to
the figure, the number of susceptible nodes S2 in diffusion set I2 first increases, then
decreases towards zero after a few seconds. In all other diffusion sets the number of
susceptible nodes decreases immediately towards zero. The number of susceptible nodes
in diffusion set I4 decreases faster than in all other diffusion sets.
Attacked states. Figure 8(b) reveals a “birth-decrease” pattern where the number
of attacked nodes born with the increase of interference in the susceptible sets decrease
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(a) Susceptible nodes. (b) Attacked nodes. (c) Removed nodes.
Figure 8. States comparison.
with time and interference to reach a threshold defining their removal. This is confirmed
in the figure by the number of attacked nodes in all diffusion sets which is a decreasing
function tending towards zero. The number of infected nodes in diffusion set I4
decreases fastest while those in diffusion set S1 decrease much slower than the others.
Removed states. Figure 8(c) reveals that the general trend of the removed nodes
is of a “growth-plateau” where the number of removed nodes initially grow and end up
plateauing after a period of time. The figure shows that the number of removed nodes
in the four diffusion sets increases until it tends to a non zero value. Note that the
removed nodes in the diffusion set I1 does not tend to the total number of nodes in the
initial set because some of them might have migrated to diffusion set I2 (see Table 2).
Parameters adjustment using diffusion rates
In this section, we study the effect of changing the migration rates by considering the
same network (see Table 2) but with a change in the migration rates of the second
diffusion set. The expectation is to evaluate the impact of the adjustment on i) the
economic efficiency when there is a need to keep the nodes in the attacked state longer
in the CPS before reaching the removed state for non-sensitive applications and ii) the
engineering efficiency where the focus is on keeping the nodes as long as possible in the
susceptible state for sensitive applications requiring high QoS.
Targeting the economic efficiency
The rates were changed by lowering the migration rate from susceptible to attacked
states by dividing it by 2 (i.e. b′2 = b2/2 = 0.01), while increasing the migration rate
from attacked to removed by multiplying it by 2 (i.e. c′2 = c2× 2 = 0.04). This
illustrates a network that requires high economic efficiency, that is the nodes are
configured to stay for a shorter time in the susceptible state but stay longer in the
attacked state before being removed. Graphs showing the change in the number of
nodes in each state are depicted in Figures 9(a)-9(c).
Figure 9(a) shows that due to the change in migration rate, the convergence time
(time to 0) for the susceptible nodes S2 in diffusion set I2 is reduced compared with the
benchmark case shown by Figure 8(a). In contrast, Figure 9(b) reveals an increase of
the convergence time of the number of attacked nodes A2 in the diffusion set I2 where
the convergence is delayed compared to the case shown by Figure 8(b). A similar
performance pattern (not reported in this paper for space saving) was observed when
similar changes to the migration rates were replicated in the other diffusion sets I1, I3
and I4. Figure 9(c) shows that the change in migration rates did not affect the removed
nodes neither in the second diffusion set I2 nor in the other diffusion sets when
compared to the benchmark scenario depicted by Figure 8(c).
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Targeting the engineering efficiency
We conducted another set of experiments where the rates were changed by increasing
the migration rate from susceptible to attacked states by multiplying it by 2 (i.e.
b′2 = b2× 2 = 0.04) while decreasing the migration rate from attacked to removed by
dividing it by 2 (i.e. c′2 = c2/2 = 0.01). This illustrates a network that requires high
engineering efficiency, that is the nodes are configured to stay longer in the susceptible
state but when they move into the attacked state, they quickly move into the removed
state. The graphs showing the change in number of nodes in each state are depicted in
Figures 10(a) - 10(c)
Figure 10(a) shows that due to the change in migration rate, the convergence time
(time to 0) for the susceptible nodes S2 in diffusion set I2 is increased compared with
the benchmark case Figure 8(a). In contrast, Figure 10(b) reveals a reduction of the
convergence time of the number of attacked nodes A2 in diffusion set I2 where the
convergence is accelerated compared to the case shown by Figure 8(b). A similar
performance pattern (not reported in this paper for space saving) was observed when
replicating similar changes in the other diffusion sets I1, I3 and I4. Like in the economic
efficiency in the previous subsection, Figure 10(c) also shows that the change in
migration rates did not affect the removed nodes Ri neither in the second diffusion set
I2 nor in the other diffusion sets when compared to the benchmark scenario depicted by
Figure 8(c).
Parameters adjustment using the network impact
We increased the network impact parameter by multiplying it by hundred and the
corresponding graphs are shown as Figure 11.
As a consequence of change in the network diffusion rate, we observe that if a
susceptible node becomes infected the following occurs:
• there will be a quick decrease of susceptible nodes in the affected diffusion set.
• a similar trend appears in the attacked interference groups where an increase
(growth) is followed by a decrease (death).
• a similar trend is observed in the removed diffusion sets.
We conducted similar experiments by multiplying the network impact by 200 and
300 respectively. The results are reported in Figures 12 and 13 respectively and reveal
similar performance patterns.
Possible triggers aiming at controlling the transmission rates and network impact
parameter consist of targeting specific interference sets by artificially amending their
nodal weights/interferences to either delay or accelerate movement into different
interference set(s).
(a) Susceptible nodes. (b) Attacked nodes. (c) Removed nodes.
Figure 9. Impact of migration rates on economic efficiency.
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(a) Susceptible nodes. (b) Attacked nodes. (c) Removed nodes.
Figure 10. Impact of migration rates on engineering efficiency.
(a) Susceptible nodes. (b) Attacked nodes. (c) Removed nodes.
Figure 11. Network Impact Factor: 100 ∗ η2.
Deployment Considerations
In this section, we present the economic impacts of our model on two types of real
networks - social networks (such as Facebook, Skype) and a Public safety
communication networks from a user’s perspective.
Facebook is a social network where the impacts of having a node affected by a virus
and thus failing is less critical than having a Public safety communication network node
being infected or failing, since the latter can have consequences on the lives of citizens.
Similarly, though less costly than traditional telecommunication systems, a Skype node
attack by a virus has less impact on humans than an attack on a Public safety
communication network.
Use cases
Public safety deals with the manipulation of sensitive information, such as fire alarms or
emergency alerts, which when infected can mislead people resulting in damages, injuries
and/or deaths. Therefore, the unit cost of infection (attacked status) in a Public safety
communication network is much higher than the unit cost of susceptible and removed
status. Building upon the assumptions made in Section , we summarise the economic
impacts of our model (2) in Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 where each cell contains the cost cij in
South African Rands of a node at state i in a network j. Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 show the
summarised cost per node in Facebook, Skype and Public safety communication
networks.
States Facebook (R) Skype (R) Public safety (R)
Susceptible 5 35 110
Attacked 55 80 210
Removed 55 55 70
Table 3. Economic impact for interference set 1
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(a) Susceptible nodes. (b) Attacked nodes. (c) Removed nodes.
Figure 12. Network Impact Factor: 200 ∗ η2.
(a) Susceptible nodes. (b) Attacked nodes. (c) Removed nodes.
Figure 13. Network Impact Factor: 300 ∗ η2.
Economic results
The epidemic model proposed in this paper was applied to the three types of networks
described above and the results were correlated to the Tables 3 - 6 to reflect realistic
costs associated with the different states of nodes within these networks. Figures 14(a),
14(b) and 14(c) reveal the trends of the average costs for different networks and states.
(a) Average cost of susceptible
nodes
(b) Average cost of attacked
nodes.
(c) Average cost of removed nodes.
Figure 14. Average cost of infection.
Figure 14(a) shows that the expected average cost in public safety communication
networks is always the most expensive and that all cost eventually tends towards zero.
On the other hand the average cost in Facebook network is least until the the cost in all
networks tends to zero. Figure 14(b) shows the same trends but the average cost in
Skype network is expected to remain less than that in Facebook. Figure 14(c) shows
that the cost of removed nodes tends to a non zero value for all networks.
19/25
States Facebook (R) Skype (R) Public safety (R)
Susceptible 10 30 105
Attacked 65 55 255
Removed 0 0 0
Table 4. Economic impact for interference set 2
States Facebook (R) Skype (R) Public safety (R)
Susceptible 20 30 70
Attacked 40 10 150
Removed 50 20 40
Table 5. Economic impact for interference set 3
States Facebook (R) Skype (R) Public safety (R)
Susceptible 20 10 50
Attacked 0 0 0
Removed 110 100 70
Table 6. Economic impact for interference set 4
Conclusion
Building upon epidemic and diffusion sets, this paper has expanded the work done
in [5, 6] to propose a compartmental network framework and a diffusion model which
uses the SAR epidemic model to find propagation patterns between the diffusion sets
and their impact on the IoT subsystem performance. The results of the numerical
evaluation of the diffusion model reveal the following:
• The diffusion sets and transmission between these sets can indeed be used to
quantify energy usage in wireless sensor networks, such that with increased
interference, the nodes in the diffusion sets move from susceptible to attacked
states and end up in the removed states where the whole network might be
destroyed (energy depleted) if deployed unmaintained as mimicked by the SAR
epidemic model proposed in this paper. Furthermore, three different trends are
revealed by the diffusion patterns for the evolution over time of nodes in the
susceptible, attacked and removed status, which are “birth-growth- decrease”,
“birth-decrease” and “growth-plateau” respectively.
• As proposed in this paper, the diffusion model uses parameters such as migration
rates and network impact which can be adjusted in a real world deployment
scenario to align a network behaviour to the service provider needs and
application constraints. Such parameters could be adjusted for example to mimic
an efficiently engineered sensor network, where the sensor nodes spend more time
in the susceptible state and less in the attacked state before removal (death) or an
economically efficient sensor network, where it is acceptable that the sensor motes
spend less time in the susceptible state but stay longer in the attacked state
before being removed.
• The impact of the diffusion sets on the interference diffusion model is revealed by
the fact that the amount of nodes in the removed class of a specific diffusion set
does not necessarily amount to the initial amount of nodes in the susceptible and
attacked classes of that diffusion set. This is due to the fact that, as suggested
earlier, the removal/death of nodes in our model may lead to moving some nodes
from one interference/epidemic set to another or the creation of new
interference/epidemic sets.
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• Though deployed in an unmaintained / autonomous mode, with predictable
migration time, the proposed model is able to mitigate the destructive effect of
interference on the whole network; which can hinder network management
processes.
As presented in this paper, the compartmental diffusion model uses global
performance parameters such as the migration rates and the network impact. As
suggested earlier in this paper, these constraints may be used to lead the IoT network
operation into a prescribed regime that meets a specific application requirement.
Amending the LIBP protocol and its underlying algorithm to track the diffusion sets
occupancy in order to move the path selection towards a given application specific
behaviour is an avenue for future work. However, it will require dealing with the local
parameters handled by the LIBP protocol. Achieving quality of service (QoS) in sensor
networks through service differentiation as done in [5] and/or multipath routing as
suggested in [24] is a challenging issue that can also be addressed as an extension to the
work presented in this paper.
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